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Effects of interactions among social capital, income, and 
learning from experiences of natural disasters:  A case 
study from Japan 
 
                   ABSTRACT 
This paper explores how and the extent to which social capital has an effect on the 
damage resulting from natural disasters.  It also examines whether the experience of a 
natural disaster affects individual and collective protection against future disasters.  
There are three major findings.  (1) Social capital reduces the damage caused by 
natural disasters. (2) The risk of a natural disaster makes people more apt to cooperate 
and therefore social capital is more effective to prevent disasters. (3) Income is an 
important factor for reducing damage, but hardly influences it when the scale of a 
disaster is small. 
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         INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing number of empirical works in the social sciences, including economics, 
have attempted to investigate issues regarding natural disasters (e.g., 
ALBALA-BERTLAND, 1993; BURTON et al., 1993; GARRET and SOBEL, 2003; TOL 
and LEEK, 1999)1.  One feature of natural disasters is that they cannot be perfectly 
forecasted since they are related to various underlying causes. This uncertainty 
obviously increases the potential economic risks.  Hence, SAWADA and SHIMIZUTANI 
(2007) explored consumption insurance against natural disasters. Such an exogenous 
shock is likely to have tremendous effect on the degree of investment in physical and 
human capital, thereby affecting economic growth (SKIDMORE and TOYA, 2002)2.  
Because of these features, humans fail to control for the occurrence of a natural disaster.  
Recent research, however, provides evidence that the degree of economic development, 
captured by the quality of institutions, social heterogeneity, social capital, and per 
capita income, has an important effect on the outcomes of natural disasters, although it 
cannot prevent them (e.g., ANBARCI et al., 2005; BOLIN 1982; BURTON et al., 1993; 
ERIKSON 1994; ESCALERAS et al., 2007; FUKUYAMA 2001; GROOTAERT 1998; 
KAHN, 2005; TOL and LEEK, 1999; TOYA and SKIDMORE, 2007).   
                                                   
1 As well, a growing number of reports on hurricane Katrina have been published (e.g., 
CONGLETON, 2006; SHUGART II 2006; SOBEL and LEESON, 2006; EWING et al., 
2007; LANDRY, 2007; CHAPPELL, 2007; BOETTKE, 2007; WHITT and WILSON, 
2007; ECKEL, 2007). 
2 The occurrence of natural disaster can be considered as an exogenous shock since it is 
impossible to predict exactly the date and place of a natural disaster. Nevertheless, the 
extent of damage from a natural disaster would be a function of physical equipment and 
the prior attitude of residents towards natural disasters.  
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Public sector corruption leads contractors to ignore a country‟s building codes and 
so buildings often fall short of the appropriate construction standards.  This is a reason 
why public sector corruption is positively associated with earthquake deaths 
(ESCALERA et al., 2007).  Institutional quality seems to be reflected in the degree to 
which a country is based on democracy.  The evidence presented by KAHN (2005) 
shows that countries with a more democratic political system suffer less deaths from 
natural disasters.  ANBARCI et al. (2005) suggest that, economic inequality hampers 
the collective action required to save lives when a natural disaster occurs. As a 
consequence, economic inequality has a detrimental effect on mitigating disaster 
damage.  On the other hand, I focus on the social capital that is defined in this paper as 
„a broad term encompassing the norm and networks facilitating collective action for 
mutual benefit‟ (WOOLCOOK 1998, p.155). Hence, social capital is likely to promote 
people to participate in civic life and so take collective action, resulting in economic 
benefit3.  Social capital is found to be more easily formed in a society where economic 
and ethnic heterogeneity is smaller (ALESINA and LA FERRARA, 2000; COSTA and 
KAHN, 2003; VIGDOR, 2004, YAMAMURA, 2008b)4.  As a result, social capital is 
expected to mitigate the damage caused by disasters via the enhancement of collective 
action. Little attention has, however, been given to the role of social capital on the 
alleviation of damage from a natural disaster.   
                                                   
3 A number of reports have attempted to investigate social capital in the modern society 
(e.g., KNACK and KEEFER, 1997; PUTNAM, 2000; O'BRIEN et al., 2005; WESTERN 
et al.,2005; BERGGREN and JORDAHL,2006; MILES and TULLY, 2007; BIRCH and 
WHITTAM, 2008).  
4 Generalized trust profoundly associated with social capital also depends on the 
features of the social structure (LEIGH, 2006a;2006b; BJǾRNSKOV, 2006). 
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Prior to natural disasters, people with a great amount of relevant information are 
less likely to suffer serious damage than those with less knowledge 5 .  Reports 
(JOVANOVIC, 1982; JOVANOVIC and NYARKO, 1996; LUCAS, 1993) note that 
learning from past experience possibly enhances the accumulation of human capital, 
leading to economic growth.  The argument of JOVANOVIC (1982) that a corporate 
entity knowing the optimal cost structure based upon a Bayesian learning process is 
similar in that an economic entity can more efficiently allocate resources through its 
experience.  Such a learning mechanism is also considered to be applicable to the way 
natural disasters are dealt with6.  That is to say, people who have experienced natural 
disasters can obtain correct information about protecting against such events or getting 
out of them (ANBARCI et al., 2005; ESCALERAS et al, 2007)7.  
Experience of disasters appears to be helpful for mitigating disaster damage, not 
only at individual and government levels, but also at the community level.  People 
seem to learn from their experiences of disasters and obtained relevant information 
about how a community member can take collective action to protect against them, and 
how the degree to which cooperative behavior benefits an individual by reducing 
                                                   
5 DYNES pointed out “the reason people do not make an effort is because they are 
unaware of the threat or because they lack good information (knowledge) about the 
risks. This, increasing awareness and information will result in appropriate mitigative 
behavior” (DYNES 2002, p.38). 
6 This paper mainly restricts its attention to the prior attitude towards disaster; that is, 
preparation for a natural disaster. However, it is also important to investigate how a 
community recovers from disaster (BOLIN and STANFORD 1998, KANIASTY and 
NORRIS 1995). 
7 It should be noted that there is a possibility that experience of natural disasters has a 
detrimental effect on resilience since those who have successfully weathered an event 
do not feel that they need to evacuate when faced with another such one. 
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damage.  Therefore, prior information about protection against disasters is considered 
to have an important effect on the efficacy of social capital to reduce disaster damage.  
Nevertheless, studies dealing with the determinants of damage arising from natural 
disasters do not pay much attention to how social capital is associated with the 
collective learning effect.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which 
social capital and the experience of natural disasters reduce damage. As well, it 
examines whether experience leads social capital to be more effective in mitigating 
damage.  Furthermore, although Japan is a developed country, Japan society remains 
relatively homogeneous and social capital deeply accumulated; therefore, people are 
more inclined to take collective action (YAMAMURA, 2008b).  Such a feature of Japan 
allows me to test how and the extent to which social capital is effective in a developed 
country. 
The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 briefly surveys 
relationships between social capital and natural disasters, and advances a testable 
hypothesis.  Section 3 presents a simple econometric framework.  Section 4 discusses 
the results of the estimations.  The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
Occurrences of natural disasters are unequally distributed around the world. As 
they are over concentrated in some areas, the importance of disaster measures differs 
among countries.  According to the CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 
(2007), 21 % of earthquakes of magnitude 6 and over occurred in Japan, although Japan 
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landmass is only 0.25% of World‟s8.  This implies that, compared with other countries, 
Japan should frequently suffer earthquake related natural disasters and therefore 
economic loss resulting from these should be recognizable. Therefore, protection against 
such damage is considered a central issue of economic policy. Compared to countries 
bordered by other ones, Japan‟s island condition is a natural limiting factor on the 
inflow of foreigners and influences from other cultures9. Therefore Japanese society 
continues to be relatively homogeneous.  The more homogeneous a society is, the easier 
it is for collective action to take place and the more profoundly people trust each other 
(ALESINA and LA FERRARA, 2000; 2002).  Ethnic and economic fragmentation are 
reported to have detrimental effects on damage arising from natural disasters, leading 
to increases in fatalities (ANBARCI et al., 2003; KAHN, 2005).  If this is the case, it is 
cogent to examine how Japan, characterized by a homogeneous society and frequent 
earthquakes, copes with natural disasters (HORWICH, 2000; SAWADA and 
                                                   
8 Japan incurred 13 % of the total amount of damage resulting from natural disasters 
worldwide during the past 30 years (CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 
2007). 
9 YAMAMURA (2008b) indicated that the Hirfindahl-type index used of the ethnic 
fragmentation of Japan is 0.02.  As suggested in ALESINA et al. (2003), the value of 
Japan is smaller not only than that of the USA (0.49) but also the UK (0.12) 
characterized by the same island geography as Japan.  A historical feature of Japan 
that illustrates an important difference from the UK should be considered to explain 
how the homogeneous Japanese character was formed.  It is widely understood that 
the rulers of Japan during the Tokugawa period between 1639 and 1859 adopted a 
closed door policy (SUGIYAMA, 1987).  The policy of seclusion was initiated as a 
response to the perceived threat posed by Christian coverts in Japan.  Such a policy 
aided by Japan‟s island geography is thought to have formed the fundamental 
homogeneous feature of Japanese society, which has persisted even after Japan opened 
up to world trade and to international exchanges.   
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SHIMIZUTANI, 2007)10. That is to say, under conditions where the population is 
racially homogenous, this research allows me to investigate how and the extent to which 
differences of age and the structure of wealth have effects on the outcomes of natural 
disasters.Information about how people and government become better at coping with 
disasters, an ability that is obtained through experience, is considered to play a critical 
role in mitigating the damage arising from a disaster (ANBARCI et.al., 2005; 
ESCALERAS et al., 2007).  An example is the Kobe, Japan, earthquake “The 
earthquake struck a community, almost no member of which expected it.  It has been 
almost a millennium since an event of comparative magnitude had occurred in the 
Kansai (Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto).  Even business and agencies that had previously drawn 
up emergency plans were caught by surprise and were unable to implement them” 
(HORWICH, 2000. p.529).   Under such conditions, local government agencies were 
unprepared and so failed to coordinate the inflow of goods and services from outside the 
stricken area (HORWICH, 2000)11. This was in part because of the lack of experience of 
a natural disaster in Kobe12.   
Delays in the initial response by the local government system were singled out for 
criticism in the aftermath of the Kobe Earthquake.  On the other hand, much attention 
                                                   
10 In Japan, social capital enhances learning from others such as from the diffusion of 
home computers (YAMAMURA, 2008a), makes a contribution to collective action such 
as responses to the Census (YAMAMURA, 2008b), and acts as informal deterrents 
against dangerously driving (YAMAMURA, 2008c). 
11 Although governments and many businesses have been ill-prepared for the disasters 
befalling them, it seems that there is a limit to how prepared they can be in the face of 
an immense disaster, such as the Kobe earthquake. 
12 During the period of recovery from the Kobe earthquake, the city‟s fire department 
built a new observation and control center and its emergency management process has 
been reorganized and enlarged (HORWICH, 2000). 
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was given to role of the informal cooperative activity such as voluntary disaster control 
organizations in reducing the damage arising from that natural disaster (TIERNERY 
and GOLTZ 1997).  This is probably because voluntary organizations are thought to 
play important roles in coordinating collective action to reduce damage13.  An area 
where people are more inclined to participate in voluntary activity is hence considered 
to have deeply accumulated social capital (PUTNAM, 2000)14.  There appear to be 
channels through which experiencing disasters affects social capital and thereby 
influences victims of disasters.  An area that tends to regularly suffer from natural 
disasters has more inclination to diffuse information concerning preventive measures 
among its communities; therefore, it reinforces the functions of social capital to cope 
with risk through collective learning.  As a consequence, social capital plays a greater 
role in mitigating damage from disasters if community members frequently experience 
such disasters15.  From the discussion as above, two hypotheses can be derived: 
 
                                                   
13 After the Kobe earthquake, the creation of informal support systems against 
disasters was considered important (SHAW and GODA 2004).  Recently, a social 
network service (SNS) has been tested by the Japanese government with the aim of 
improving community building and disaster management (SCHELLONG 2007). 
14 PUTNAM (2000) points out that social capital has a positive effect but also has a 
detrimental one upon human behavior.  DURLAUF (1999) asserts that social capital 
facilitates intragroup coordination by enhancing group identity, which, in turn, may 
promote intergroup hostility. PELLING (1998) found in a case study of Guyana that 
marginalized groups continued to be excluded from local participatory decision making 
in environmental management. 
15 It is also likely that social capital will make a community more resilient; that is, the 
community is more likely to recover quickly from a disaster.  When hurricane Katrina 
occurred, the Catholic Church in New Orleans helped organize crews of returning 
residents to assist one another repairing homes (BOETTKE et al., 2007). 
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Hypothesis 1: An area with highly accumulated social capital has a tendency to 
have less victims of natural disasters.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Prior experience of disaster reinforces the function of social capital 
through a learning process, resulting in a reduction of victim numbers16. 
 
 DATA AND METHOD 
 
Data and model 
     The data set used in this study is a survey panel of 47 prefectures covering 14 
years from 1988 to 2001.  Table 1 includes variable definitions, means, standard 
deviations, coefficients of variation, and maximums and minimums of analyzed data.  
The variables are discussed later.  Number of victims, numbers of natural disasters, 
per capita income, number of fire fighting teams, and the number of immigrants are 
derived from INDEX PUBLISHING (2006)17.  Data about the numbers of natural 
disasters used in this research comprise the numbers of roads, bridges, banks that 
suffered from disasters and the numbers of landslides; all of which can be viewed as 
outcomes of earthquakes and hurricanes. In this research, under constraints of data 
limitations, a natural disaster is empirically defined as above 18 . Therefore, the 
                                                   
16 It should be noted that, besides the effects of social capital, the experience of a 
disaster would have effects on the damage from another natural disaster through 
various channels. For instance, the disaster experience might lead to better 
infrastructure and better state policies, both of which are related to learning, but not 
necessary to social capital.  
17 Victims are defined here as injured persons who need medical care. 
18 It should be noted that whether an earthquake is a disaster or not generally depends 
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magnitude of an earthquake and the intensity of a hurricane are considered to be 
reflected in the “number of victims”.  There is wide range of intensities of natural 
disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes.  For instance, earthquakes occur every 
day but most are too weak to be perceived and therefore have no impact on people.  
Accordingly, I confront a difficulty in accurately counting natural disasters.  The 
method of counting seems to affect the results and so cause an estimation bias.  This is 
the reason why I considered observable outcomes of a “natural disaster” as disasters19.    
The total population number and the population subgroup over 70 years old, the 
number of those receiving public assistance, the number of policemen, the numbers of 
houses, public baths, and community centers, are from the ASAHI NEWSPAPER (2004).  
Some variables, including the numbers of public baths, community centers and fire 
fighting teams are divided by the population to obtain per capita values.  The 
proportions of elderly and those receiving public assistance are calculated from the 
number over 70 years old, and the number receiving public assistance divided by the 
total population number, respectively. 
  There are several reports that have investigated fatalities in natural disasters 
(ANBARCI et al. 2005; ESCALERAS et al., 2007; KAHN 2005); however, these cover 
only a portion of the victims of disasters and so do not accurately reflect the full damage 
caused20.  Thus this paper considers all victims as observed at the moment of an event.  
                                                                                                                                                     
on the extent to which daily life was disrupted and the damage. The “empirical” 
definition in this paper is different. 
19 The number of intense hurricanes and earthquakes can be obtained from NATIONAL 
ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY JAPAN (2006).  The similar results were provided 
when these data are used. 
20 TOYA and SKIDMORE (2007) explored not only fatalities but also the index of 
economic damage measured by the estimated damage in real US $ when disasters 
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VICTIM, for which this paper attempts to examine determinants, is a non-negative 
count of victims of natural disasters.  As such, a basic, and appropriate, estimation 
method is the poisson model.  However, a shortcoming of the poisson model for this 
analysis is its assumption of an equal conditional mean and variance for the dependent 
variable.  That is, to be appropriate in our case, the poisson model requires the 
conditional mean of VICTIM to be equal to its variance.  As such, the poisson model is 
best applied in conditions where there is limited variation in the dependent variable.   
However, from Table1 it can be seen that maximum and minimum values are 62,085 
and 0 respectively, and the standard deviation is 4,314, indicating the variation of the 
dependent variable is clearly a large one.  As well, an over-dispersion of the number of 
victims is manifest in Table 2, showing the percentile rank.  Numbers of victims in the 
lowest percentile, the 10th percentile, is 1 whereas that of the highest is 1645.  Taking 
table 1 into account, the mean value, 914, is above the 80th percentile.  Hence, careful 
attention must be paid to the over-dispersion of dependent variables when estimations 
are conducted.  In such a situation, the use of a poisson process to estimate typically 
causes a downward bias in the model‟s standard errors.  In line with reports 
concerning fatalities arising from natural disasters (ESCALERAS et al, 2007), a 
negative binominal model should be employed since this model generalizes the poisson 
process by expressly relaxing the assumption of an equal conditional mean and variance 
through the introduction of a parameter accounting for any unobserved heterogeneity 
between observations.  What is more, using the zero-inflated negative binominal model 
introduces a splitting process, thus considering a zero victims account (KAHN, 2005). 
Estimation by the zero-inflated negative binominal model uses a logit where the 
                                                                                                                                                     
occurred. 
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dependent variable equals 1 if there is no victim arising from a disaster.  The logit 
model includes the number of natural disasters in year t and the interaction of its 
account with income.   
 
Function form 
  Following the discussion above, the estimated function of the number of victims 
then takes the following form21: 
VICTIM it= 0 +1NDISit +2AVDISit + 3PBATHit  + 4PBATHit * AVDISit + 
5CENTEit + 6CENTEit * AVDISit + 7FFIGHTit + 8FFIGHTt * 
AVDISit  + 9POLICit +  10IMIGit + 11 POPit + 12PORATit + 
13OLDRATit +14INCOMit + +νt +ωit , 
where VICTIM represents the number of victims in prefecture i in year t, and ‟s 
represents the regression parameters.νt  represent the unobservable specific effects of 
year t (a fixed effect time vector)respectively; ωit represents the error term.   
As mentioned, the structure of the data set used in this study is a survey panel of 
47 prefectures covering the 14 years from 1988 to 2001.  Macroeconomic conditions will 
be captured inνt, and I incorporate each year‟s dummy variables to restrain the time 
specific effects.      
Though it seems obvious, it needs noting that an area can only contain victims of 
natural disasters if a natural disaster actually takes place there.  Following 
Kahn(2005), in the logit model of the splitting stage where the number of disasters that 
a prefecture i experiences in year t and its interaction term of the log form of per capita 
                                                   
21 Values of coefficients can be interpreted as the elasticity of the number of victims 
with respect to the corresponding independent variables, which are evaluated at the 
sample mean values of the variables.   
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income and population size, which are represented as NDIS, NDIS*Ln(INCOME) and 
NDIS*Ln(POP) respectively, are incorporated as independent variables.  The 
interaction term of a disaster‟s count with income level and population would account 
for the possibility that prefectures with higher incomes and smaller populations are less 
inclined to suffer victims from disasters that occur.  NDIS*INCOME and NDIS*POP 
are thus expected to take positive and negative signs since the logit model estimates the 
probability that nobody in a given prefecture in a given year becomes a victim of a 
natural disaster. 
I now proceed to discuss determinants of the number of victims.  The number of 
disasters, represented as NDIS, in year t and in prefecture i convincingly increases the 
number of victims and therefore takes a negative coefficient sign.  As earlier discussed, 
people who experience disasters are better able to acquire information useful for 
preventing the effects of natural disasters, and so to reduce damage through leaning 
processes.  To test this hypothesis, AVDIS, the average number of disasters occurring 
in past years is included as an explanatory variable to capture disaster experience22.  
The choice of the past years seems to have an effect upon the outcomes of estimation. If 
the prediction is supported, the sign of AVDIS becomes negative.  To check the 
robustness of the results, I use three alternative variables (1) number of disaster 
occurring in the past year, namely, years t-1 in prefecture i,  (2) the average number of 
disasters occurring from years t-1 to t-3 in prefecture i,  (3) the average number of 
disasters occurring from years t-1 to t-5 in prefecture i.  Furthermore, the importance 
                                                   
22 CABITNET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (2007) reports that the past 
experience of disasters encourage people to take precautions against future disasters, 
whereas the effect of experience on cautious behavior diminishes as time passes.  
Therefore, this paper restricts past experiences to those within three years. 
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of the experience of a natural disaster seems to change as time passes.  These 
alternative variables also allow me to examine how and the extent to which passing 
time affects residents‟ behavior against a natural disaster.   
There appear to be various ways of measuring the degree of social capital the 
relevance of proxies for social capital will need to be checked (CALLOIS and AUBERT 
2007; WESTERN et al., 2005). As mentioned in the introduction, social capital is a 
concept covering norms and social networks. According to HAYAMI (2001), norms and 
social capital are formed through long-term and intensive interpersonal interactions. 
The intensity of inter-personal interactions should thus be captured when social capital 
is measured, especially in the Asian (Japanese) context. Therefore, the influence of 
social capital can be considered to be limited within a local community. Considering this 
point, the following independent variables are used as proxies of social capital23.  
 In traditional Japanese daily life, public baths were used by community members 
who, apart from the wealthy, ordinarily lived in houses without a private bath.  
Through the use of such baths people could get acquainted with neighbors and generate 
a social network.  In modern Japan, most residences have their own baths, and people 
are therefore more likely to take a bath at home.  However, a new type of public bath 
featuring more deluxe baths and saunas has recently developed, and these are used by 
all sectors of society, thus providing a place to meet neighbors and form social capital 
                                                   
23 Existing literature mainly concerns western countries, variables such as newspaper 
reading, volunteer activity, and voter turnout are considered to capture social capital. 
They also seem appropriate as surrogate social capital in Japan (YAMAMURA 2009); 
however, these variables are not available every year. Therefore they cannot be 
incorporated in this paper since the data set of this paper is a panel structure that 
requires annual data.    
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(YAMAMURA, 2008a).  The number of public baths, represented as PBATH, can thus 
serve as a proxy for social capital.  Therefore, the signs of PBATH are predicted to be 
negative. People are more likely to trust each other and then take collective action if 
there is a place where they can communicate with each other and if the community is 
well organized (PUTNAM, 2000).  CNETE, which is the number of community centers, 
is a proxy for social capital.  Hence, the signs of CENTE are expected to be negative. 
Earthquakes, as one of their results, are likely to entail fires as secondary events.  
Modern Japanese society is rooted in a system of group responsibility within a 
community.  For instance, the community fire-fighting team, represented as FFIGHT 
originated in the Edo period and continues today (GOTO, 2001).  Community 
fire-fighting teams, informal institutions, are still called for today because of the 
scarcity of public firehouses, which are regarded as formal institutions, and hence act as 
substitutes for public firehouses.  What is more, these teams play an important role, 
not only in deterring fire but also in generating social capital through interpersonal 
communication in a cooperative protective activity against disaster (GOTO, 2001).  
Hence, fire-fighting teams are thought to have an important disaster prevention role.  
Members belonging to such teams also regularly patrol within their community to 
ensure that precautions are taken against fire; thereby keeping an eye on the streets, 
buildings and houses within their community.  As a result of such activity, communal 
fire-fighting teams also function as a vigilant corps so that criminal behavior such as 
robbery, which is likely to occur after a disaster, is prevented24.  As a consequence, the 
signs of FFIGHT are expected to be negative. 
                                                   
24 LEDERMAN et al (2002) uses international data to examine the social capital effect 
upon crime and suggests that countries with larger social capital are more apt to have 
reduced crime rates. 
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As noted before, experience of a natural disaster provides useful information 
concerning protection against future natural disasters, and then reinforces the function 
of social capital to take collective action to mitigate damage from a disaster.  To test 
this hypothesis, which is the primary focus of this paper, cross terms between proxies of 
social capital and experience of disasters need to be checked.  That is to say, the signs 
of PBATH*AVDIS, CENTE*AVDIS and FFIGHT*AVDIS are given careful attention and 
are predicted to become negative. 
Police are considered to be the emergency first responder to a natural disaster and 
therefore POLIC is expected to take negative sign.  Frequent movers weaken 
community ties; therefore, communities with higher rates of residential turnover are 
less well integrated. This is why residential mobility tends to undermine 
community-based social capital (PUTNAM, 2000); thereby hampering the collective 
action required to alleviate damage from a disaster.  Hence, it is possible that the 
coefficients of IMIG, which is the number of immigrants from other prefectures arriving 
during the last year, take a positive sign.  
  The number of victims is expected to become larger in areas where a larger 
number of residents live if the scale of the natural disasters is of the same magnitude.    
Accordingly, the sign of POP representing total population is predicted to become 
positive.  Lower income people are more likely to suffer from a natural disaster since 
they appear to live in more humble residences.  The proportion of poor people thus 
increases the number of victims of disasters.  In Japan, individuals living below a 
poverty threshold can be in receipt of public assistance so that the proportion of those 
who are in receipt of public assistance, which is denoted as PORAT, is regarded to proxy 
for the poor people rate.  In addition, it seems reasonable that elderly people cannot 
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make a quick response in an emergency, leading them to become victims.  OLDRAT, 
which stands for the proportion of those over 70 years old, is incorporate to capture such 
an effect.  Accordingly, PORAT and OLDRAT will also take a positive sign. 
 INCOM, representing per capita income is used to capture economic conditions.  
The number of victims is expected to become larger in areas where a larger number of 
residents live if the scale of the natural disasters is of the same magnitude.  Areas with 
higher income are convincingly more able to build earthquake resistant buildings and 
provide anti-earth quake equipment.  Accordingly, the signs of INCOM are predicted to 
become negative. 
 
RESULTS            
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the zero inflated negative binominal 
estimations.  In both tables, columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) show the results when the 
number of disasters occurring in the past year is used as AVDIS.  Columns (2), (5), (8) 
and (11) show the results when the average number of disasters occurring in the past 
three years is used as AVDIS.  Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) show the results when the 
average number of disasters occurring in the past five years is used as AVDIS. To 
properly compare the results, values presented in the upper panel are the elasticity, 
which is evaluated at the sample mean values of the dependent and each independent 
variable. The results of Table 3 were estimated using all samples, 658 observations.  As 
explained before, the zero inflated negative binominal model is employed to take into 
account the effect of outliers; thus it seems reasonable to ask whether the outcomes of 
estimations are at least somewhat influenced by outliers.  As discussed for Tables 1 
and 2 in the previous section, the sample is indeed skewed.  To take this into account 
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and to check the robustness of the outcome presented in Table 4, re-estimations are 
conducted when samples are restricted to those under 100 victims and therefore the 
observations become 356.   
  
Logit estimation 
 In the bottom part of both tables, the results of the logit model of the splitting 
stage are reported. The cross term of NDIS and POP shows a negative sign for the 
coefficient in all estimations. Furthermore, the results of Tables 3 and 4 indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 % level in all estimations.  Although contrary to the 
prediction, the signs of the cross terms of NDIS and INCOM become negative, but are 
not statistically significant in all estimations.  Overall, these results are consistent 
with the prediction that larger population areas are more likely to have victims when a 
disaster occurs.  
 
Estimation results using all samples 
I now discuss the results of the negative binominal model after the splitting stage 
in Table 3.  The significant positive signs of NDIS in all estimations of Table 3 are 
compatible with the prediction.  With respect to AVDIS, all results show negative signs. 
As shown in the second row of columns (1) and (2), the fact that AVDIS is statistically 
significant, reveals that the learning effect makes a contribution to decreasing the 
number of victims.  Nevertheless, column (3) is insignificant statistically, and its 
absolute value of 0.02 is remarkably smaller than those of (1) and (2).  It follows from 
this that past experience reduces victim numbers but its effect diminishes as time 
passes.  
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   With respect to the proxies for social capital, in columns (1), (2) and (3), CENTE , 
PBATH and FFIGHT take the anticipated negative sign of CENTE.  In particular, 
CENTE is significant at the 1 % level.  This indicates that social capital alleviates 
damage from disasters.  Any insignificance of PBATH and FFIGHT are likely to be 
driven by potential shortcomings such as the skewness of the sample caused by 
outliers25.  To investigate the learning effect through the experience of a disaster on the 
effectiveness of social capital, I check the results of the cross term of AVNDIS with 
proxies of social capital such as PBATH*AVNDIS, CNETE*AVNDIS and 
FFIGHT*AVNDS.  As predicted previously, in all the of the interaction terms, their 
signs become negative.  They become statistically significant when past experience is 
measured by the number of disaster occurring in the past year and in the past three 
years, but they become insignificant in the case using the number in the past five years.  
Furthermore, as shown in column (6), the absolute value of PBATH * AVDIS, which is 
0.01 for both, is distinctly smaller than in columns (4) and (5), which are 0.06 and 0.04, 
respectively.  The same tendency is observed concerning CENTE * AVDIS in columns 
(7)-(9) and FFIGHT * AVDIS in columns (10)-(12), indicating that the absolute values 
when AVDIS is calculated by the natural disasters in the past five years are by far 
smaller than the other values.   Restricting attention to the results in the case that 
AVNDIS is calculated by data of the past year and the past three years, the absolute 
values of AVDIS and its interaction terms are between 0.04 and 0.08, indicating their 
elasticity is relatively modest.  In line with the prediction, these results imply that the 
                                                   
25 Another possible reason for their unpredicted can be found in the argument of 
LEDERMAN et al. (2002), that the indicators of social capital they defined reflect both 
group-specific and society-wide social capital, which are expected to promote and reduce 
collective action, respectively.  Therefore these opposite effects neutralize each other. 
20 
 
experience of a disaster accumulates the human capital necessary to protect against a 
future one; this then reinforces the function of social capital to coordinate collective 
action when a disaster occurs.  Nevertheless, such an interaction effect has a tendency 
to disappear as time passes.   
Contrary to the prediction, the signs of POLIC become positive, though 
insignificant, meaning that the police did not make a contribution to a reduction of 
victims.  In all estimations, the significant negative signs of IMIG suggested that a 
decay of social capital causes impediments to the success of collective action, thereby 
increasing the number of victims.   
Consistent with the prediction, in all estimations, POP take significant predicted 
signs and their values are larger than 4.  As well, PORAT and OLDRAT take their 
anticipated signs although PORAT are not significant; indicating that poor and old 
individuals are more inclined to suffer from disasters.  INCOM take their significant 
predicted signs and their values are larger than 3.  From this can be derived the fact 
that the economic condition tremendously affects on the number of victims.  Especially, 
the fact that if income rises 1 %, the number of victims decreases by about 4 %; 
reflecting that areas with higher incomes can to a large extent afford to protect against 
disasters. 
 
Estimation results with the victims restriction 
The determinants of the number of victims appear to depend on the magnitude 
of the disaster, while the skewness of the sample seems to influence the results, as 
argued by ESCALERAS et al. (2007).  For a closer examination to take into these 
issues into account, I re-estimated using the same model but in which samples were 
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restricted to a number of victims smaller than 10026.  These results are shown in Table 
4.  Looking at columns (1) and (2) reveals in regard to AVNDIS, as reported in the 
second row, significant negative signs and the value of the coefficient. Column (3) 
suggests insignificance and a smaller value.  Turning to the effects of social capital as 
captured by PBATH, CENTE, and FFIGHT, with the exception of PBATH, the 
coefficient signs become negative.  These results are almost the same when all samples 
are used, as discussed before.    It follows from the results discussed so far that not 
only a learning effect but also social capital are negatively associated with the number 
of victims resulting from natural disasters.   
Switching attention to columns (4)-(12), where the cross terms of disaster 
experience and social capital are reported, I next examine how the learning effect 
reinforces social capital.  Consistent with the prediction, all signs of PBATH*AVNDIS, 
CNETE*AVNDIS and FFIGHT*AVNDS are negative, and are equivalent to those 
presented in Table 3.  In terms of the absolute values of the coefficients shown in 
columns (4),(5), (7),(8),(10), and (11), AVDIS and its interaction terms are between 0.02 
and 0.06, suggesting they are almost at the same level as in Table 3.   On the other 
hand, when I used AVNDIS calculated using data from the past five years, they are not 
statistically significant and the absolute values become pronouncedly smaller.  Taken 
together, the impacts on disaster damage of learning, social capital and their interaction 
do not disappear even when the scale of natural disasters is small, so long as the focus is 
on disaster experiences limited to those within a few years.  Put another way, these 
                                                   
26 While the estimation results shown in table 3 are based on the zero-inflated negative 
binominal model designed to take into account the effect of outliers, it seems reasonable 
to question whether the outliers matter since the sample is skewed as mentioned 
previously. 
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effects are stable regardless of which samples are used and so are not affected by the 
scale of a disaster.  Hence, the estimation results concerning Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
robust under the different samples, indicating that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly 
supported.  Nevertheless, it is very interesting to observe that these effects diminish 
strikingly when I take more distant past events into account.  According to the 
CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (2007), people in Japan are likely to 
take measures to cope with a natural disaster immediately after they experience a 
disaster but cease from doing so as time passes.  From this I derive the argument that 
the precautions against the risk of a disaster surge as an outcome of a disaster 
experience but then gradually decrease over time.  The findings I have presented thus 
far are considered to reflect the feature of human behavior pointed out by the CABINET 
OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (2007).     
I found it interesting that the coefficients of INCOM in Table 4, contrary to 
expectations, take positive signs in all columns.  Accordingly, in respect to the per 
capita income, there is remarkable difference from those reported in Table 3 showing 
negative significant signs.  What is more, the coefficient values INCOM are smaller 
than 1.00; far smaller than those shown in Table3.  I derived from this that economic 
conditions are not associated with disaster damage when disasters are small in scale.  
Combining the estimation results in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that the effects of 
economic conditions on disaster damage are affected by the restriction of samples.   
The fact that higher incomes are more likely to reduce the number of victims does not 
persist when samples are restricted to a small number of victims.  I interpret these 
results as follows.  According to the theoretical model developed by ANBARCI et al. 
(2005), the per capita level of income increases the provability of collective action in the 
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form of the creation and enforcement of building codes, appropriate professional 
licensing, and earthquake-sensitive zoning27.  That is, areas where income is at a high 
level have more ability to cope with natural disasters, mainly through the 
intensification of physical structures such as the provision of earthquake-resistant 
buildings, fire proof-buildings, and/or fire-prevention equipment.  Such measures seem 
to be effective in alleviating the damage when inordinate scale disasters strike 
buildings.  In the case where the magnitude of a disaster is, however, too modest to 
damage the physical structure, economic conditions such as per capita income do not 
affect outcomes. 
To sum the evidence presented so far; factors concerning disaster experience and 
social capital for reducing disaster damage persist even with the different samples28.  
However, per capita income has tremendous effects on any resulting damage, though 
this relationship disappears because of the restriction of our samples.  The evidence 
above seems to indicate that informal cooperative activity promoted through 
accumulation of social capital plays an important role in alleviating disaster damage, 
especially in cases where the disaster is not of a large scale, being one in which 
economic factors can make no contribution to the reduction of damage. 
                                                   
27 The collective action required here is different from that required for informal 
voluntary activity promoted by social capital. 
28 Various factors, such as policy making and investment for physical equipment, which 
are not considered in this research, are however thought to have made a contribution to 
the results. Thus, care is needed in interpreting these results and the findings observed 
in this study will require future scrutiny. 
. 
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        CONCLUSION 
 
It is impossible to control the occurrences of natural disasters, but it is possible to 
alleviate damage to some extent.  An example is taking protection action against a 
future natural disaster; indeed, this is an area where local government is expected to 
assume an important role in coping with disasters.  Nevertheless, the Kobe earthquake 
case in Japan shows what can go wrong; in that event, the initial response system of the 
local government organs was delayed and indeed malfunctioned, whereas informal 
cooperative activity such as voluntary disaster control organizations responded 
promptly, resulting in a reduction of the damage arising from this natural disaster.  To 
reduce damage, collective action is called for and voluntary organizations are important.  
Therefore, informal organizations are likely to decrease damage through their collective 
action in areas where there is high social cohesion and therefore people are more 
inclined to participate in voluntary activities.    
Through experiencing a natural disaster, individuals may learn the how to deal 
with a future natural disaster.  As well, this experience is apt to change the attitude of 
individuals regarding disasters.  As larger amounts of information concerning natural 
disasters are obtained, individuals are more likely to perceive latent damage resulting 
from a lack of appropriate measures, and therefore take steps to cope.  
The main aim of this paper has been to examine how and the extent to which the 
experience of a natural disaster, social capital, and their interaction are related with 
damage resulting from natural disasters measured by the number of victims.   To this 
end, using prefecture level data of Japan for the years between 1988 and 2001, this 
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paper ascertained the determinants of the number of victims of natural disasters.  The 
major findings from this study were: (1) Social capital reduces damage resulting from 
natural disasters. (2) Abundant information concerning natural disasters obtained 
through past experiences makes people more apt to cooperate and therefore social 
capital becomes more effective to prevent disasters.  Nevertheless, it becomes less 
effective as time passes after the experience of a disaster.    (3) A high level of income 
makes much more contribution than social capital to a reduction in the number of 
victims; nevertheless, the level of income hardly affects the number of victims in small 
scale disasters, hence social capital makes a greater contribution in this situation.     
From the estimations here, I derived an argument that, in general, physical 
equipment and infrastructure against disasters are more effective than cooperative 
behavior, namely collective action, among people.  By contrast, cooperative behavior 
becomes relatively more effective in small scale disasters.  What is more, thanks to a 
spillover of information about natural disasters, cooperative behavior is thought to be 
more easily organized, thereby reducing the damage resulting from such a disaster.  
The positive effect of the disaster experience on cooperative behavior deteriorates as 
time passes after people experience a disaster, because people‟ decrease their 
precautions against a future disaster.  It follows from this that a government should 
not only provide physical equipment, but should also make efforts to transmit more 
information about natural disasters to stimulate and promote collective action by it 
citizens against disaster. 
This study uses aggregated-level data at a prefecture level and so individual 
responses to natural disasters cannot be considered.  Further, I consider the experience 
of suffering disasters to be a proxy for the quantity of information about disasters 
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obtained by people.  This assumption, however, may not be sufficiently convincing.  
Accordingly, a more appropriate measure for the information acquired by people prior to 
disaster is called for. As well, this paper did not capture the influence of the experience 
of disaster on improvements of infrastructure and policy.  For a better understanding 
of the findings in this paper, more purposefully constructed individual-level data needs 
to be obtained and the various latent effects of the disaster experience should be 
controlled for.   These are issues remaining to be addressed in future study. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient  
of variation 
Max Min 
VICTIM 
 
Number of victims  914 4314 4.71 62,085 0 
NDIS 
 
Number of natural disasters 91 262 2.85 4,898 0 
AVNDIS 
(1 year) 
Number of disasters during the past 
year. 
102 289 2.83 4,898 0 
AVNDIS 
(3 Years) 
Average number of disasters during the 
past three years. 
103 169 1.63 1,708 1 
AVNDIS 
(5 Years) 
Average number of disasters during the 
past five years. 
124 270 2.17 3,516 1.6 
PBATH 
 
Per capita number of public baths  0.21*10-3 0.07*10-3 0.33 0.49*10-3 0.09*10-3 
CENTE 
 
Per capita number of community centers 0.22*10-3 0.17*10-3 0.77 0.90*10-3 0.07*10-3 
FFIGHT 
 
Per capita number of fire fighting teams 0.31*10-3 0.14*10-3 0.45 0.62*10-3 0.04*10-3 
POLIC 
 
Number of policemen 4,763 6,536 1.37 42,197 1,069 
IMIG 
 
Share of immigrants from other 
prefectures a) 
21*10-3 5*10-3 0.26 42*10-3 10*10-3 
POP Population numbersa) 
 
2,648 2,393 0.90 11,900 616 
PORAT 
 
The share of those receiving public 
assistance 
7.45*10-3 4.52*10-3 0.606 28.6*10-3 1.77*10-3 
OLDRAT 
 
The share of elderly over 70 years old. 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.19 0.05 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income b) 2,838 408 0.14 4.813 1.915 
Notes: a) expressed in thousands 
     b) expressed in thousands of yen. 
Table 2.Distribution of victims 
Percentile  
10 1 
 
20 5 
 
30 12.7 
 
40 26.6 
 
50 67 
 
60 139 
 
70 
 
266 
80 594 
 
90 
 
1645 
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                         Table 3  Determinants of the number of victims (Zero inflated negative-binominal model) 
 (1)  
1Year 
(2) 
3Years 
(3) 
5 Years 
(4) 
1 Year 
(5) 
3 Years 
(6) 
5 Years 
(7) 
1 Year 
(8) 
3 Years 
(9) 
5 Years 
(10) 
1 Year 
(11) 
3 Years 
(12) 
5 Years 
NDIS 
 
0.41** 
(3.90) 
0.42** 
(3.85) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
0.41** 
(3.89) 
0.42** 
(3.86) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
0.41** 
(3.86) 
0.42** 
(3.83) 
0.42** 
(3.89) 
0.41** 
(3.87) 
0.42** 
(3.84) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
AVNDIS 
 
-0.05* 
(-1.95) 
-0.06* 
(-1.96) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
         
PBATH 
 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
PBATH* 
  AVNDIS 
   -0.06** 
(-7.49) 
-0.04* 
(-1.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.64) 
      
CENTE -0.36** 
(-2.60) 
-0.38** 
(-2.72) 
-0.31* 
(-2.17) 
-0.34** 
(-2.54) 
-0.37** 
(-2.70) 
-0.33* 
(-2.23) 
-0.26* 
(-1.74) 
-0.29* 
(-2.14) 
-0.33* 
(-2.11) 
-0.35** 
(-2.60) 
-0.38** 
(-2.76) 
-0.31* 
(-2.13) 
CENTE* 
  AVNDIS 
      -0.05** 
(-2.95) 
-0.07** 
(-2.58) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
   
FFIGHT -0.12 
(-0.47) 
-0.10 
(-0.37) 
-0.12 
(-0.45) 
-0.13 
(-0.49) 
-0.11 
(-0.41) 
-0.13 
(-0.48) 
-0.16 
(-0.59) 
-0.12 
(-0.44) 
-0.13 
(-0.50) 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
-0.06 
(-0.22) 
-0.10 
(-0.39) 
FFIGHT* 
  AVNDIS 
         -0.08** 
(-8.81) 
-0.05* 
(-2.24) 
-0.02 
(-0.99) 
POLIC 0.24 
(1.02) 
0.25 
(1.06) 
0.25 
(1.07) 
0.24 
(1.05) 
0.25 
(1.05) 
0.25 
(1.09) 
0.27 
(1.16) 
0.25 
(1.08) 
0.26 
(1.10) 
0.26 
(1.11) 
0.25 
(1.07) 
0.25 
(1.08) 
IMIG 
 
0.84* 
(2.15) 
0.93* 
(2.31) 
0.85* 
(2.15) 
0.87* 
(2.21) 
0.90* 
(2.25) 
0.83* 
(2.09) 
0.84* 
(2.13) 
0.89* 
(2.25) 
0.81* 
(2.04) 
0.87* 
(2.21) 
0.92* 
(2.28) 
0.84* 
(2.12) 
POP 4.47** 
(4.46) 
4.50** 
(4.54) 
4.44** 
(4.46) 
4.49** 
(4.54) 
4.43** 
(4.49) 
4.42** 
(4.44) 
4.58** 
(4.62) 
4.48** 
(4.55) 
4.41** 
(4.43) 
4.50** 
(4.54) 
4.44** 
(4.50) 
4.42** 
(4.43) 
PORAT 
 
0.31 
(1.41) 
0.29 
(1.29) 
0.32 
(1.40) 
0.32 
(1.43) 
0.30 
(1.30) 
0.32 
(1.49) 
0.32 
(1.44) 
0.28 
(1.25) 
0.33 
(1.45) 
0.29 
(1.31) 
0.28 
(1.23) 
0.32 
(1.40) 
OLDRAT 
 
1.60* 
(1.67) 
1.69* 
(1.76) 
1.64* 
(1.70) 
1.62* 
(1.70) 
1.72* 
(1.79) 
1.66* 
(1.73) 
1.59* 
(1.66) 
1.70* 
(1.77) 
1.67* 
(1.73) 
1.59* 
(1.67) 
1.72* 
(1.79) 
1.64* 
(1.70) 
INCOM 
 
-3.89** 
(-2.92) 
-4.21** 
(-3.21) 
-4.15** 
(-3.14) 
-3.98** 
(-3.05) 
-4.30** 
(-3.24) 
-4.16** 
(-3.13) 
-4.09** 
(-3.11) 
-4.33** 
(-3.29) 
-4.14** 
(-3.11) 
-4.08** 
(-3.12) 
-4.37** 
(-3.28) 
-4.18** 
(-3.16) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Logit Model     
NDIS 
 
4.58* 
(2.21) 
4.59* 
(2.28) 
4.56* 
(2.22) 
4.51* 
(2.20) 
4.56* 
(2.25) 
4.58* 
(2.22) 
4.49* 
(2.15) 
4.49* 
(2.24) 
4.60* 
(2.22) 
4.51* 
(2.21) 
4.58* 
(2.27) 
4.56* 
(2.21) 
NDIS* 
Ln(INCOM) 
-0.22 
(-0.83) 
-0.22 
(-0.87) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
-0.21 
(-0.81) 
-0.22 
(-0.85) 
-0.22 
(-0.83) 
-0.20 
(-0.76) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
-0.22 
(-0.84) 
-0.21 
(-0.82) 
-0.22 
(-0.87) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
NDIS* 
Ln(POP) 
-0.21** 
(-2.77) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.88) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.87) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.86) 
-0.21** 
(-2.79) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.87) 
 2.57** 2.57** 2.57** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 
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(45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.9) (45.9) (45.9) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) 
Samples 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 
Non-zero samples 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 
Notes: Each column of this table reports a separate estimate of a zero inflated negative binominal model. As discussed in the text, this model has two equations.  The lower panel of the table reports the logit 
model estimates of the probability that nobody becomes a victim of a natural disaster. The upper panel reports the results from the negative binominal regression where numbers are elastic and are evaluated at 
the sample mean values of the dependent and each independent variable, and values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the delta method using robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  In each estimate, constants, year dummies, rates of primary industry populations, number of households, and hours of sunlight are included but not reported to save space 
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                        Table 4.  Determinants of the number of victims (Zero inflated negative-binominal model)  Number of victims<100 
 (1)  
1Year 
(2) 
3Years 
(3) 
5 Years 
(4) 
1 Year 
(5) 
3 Years 
(6) 
5 Years 
(7) 
1 Year 
(8) 
3 Years 
(9) 
5 Years 
(10) 
1 Year 
(11) 
3 Years 
(12) 
5 Years 
NDIS 
 
0.18 
(1.10) 
0.19 
(1.24) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
0.18 
(1.13) 
0.19 
(1.20) 
0.18 
(1.19) 
0.18 
(1.09) 
0.18 
(1.17) 
0.18 
(1.18) 
0.18 
(1.08) 
0.19 
(1.17) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
AVNDIS 
 
-0.03** 
(-3.66) 
-0.07* 
(-1.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.66) 
         
PBATH 
 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.33) 
0.10 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
PBATH* 
  AVNDIS 
   -0.02** 
(-4.31) 
-0.04* 
(-1.99) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
      
CENTE -0.20* 
(-1.79) 
-0.19* 
(-1.73) 
-0.17 
(-1.42) 
-0.19* 
(-1.76) 
-0.17 
(-1.57) 
-0.18 
(-1.48) 
-0.15 
(-1.34) 
-0.12 
(-0.92) 
-0.18 
(-1.47) 
-0.20* 
(-1.85) 
-0.19* 
(-1.72) 
-0.16 
(-1.36) 
CENTE* 
  AVNDIS 
      -0.02* 
(-1.87) 
-0.03 
(-0.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
   
FFIGHT -0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.21 
(-1.14) 
-0.22 
(-1.16) 
-0.22 
(-1.19) 
-0.23 
(-1.22) 
-0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.22 
(-1.15) 
-0.22 
(-1.18) 
-0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.19 
(-1.00) 
-0.15 
(-0.80) 
-0.21 
(-1.09) 
FFIGHT* 
  AVNDIS 
         -0.03** 
(-5.87) 
-0.06** 
(-2.83) 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
POLIC -0.17 
(-1.36) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(-1.32) 
-0.17 
(1.39) 
-0.17 
(-1.36) 
-0.17 
(-1.33) 
-0.16 
(-1.32) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(1.33) 
-0.17 
(-1.39) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(-1.32) 
IMIG 
 
0.05 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
POP 1.43* 
(2.23) 
1.59** 
(2.43) 
1.31* 
(2.07) 
1.36* 
(2.13) 
1.48* 
(2.31) 
1.29* 
(2.03) 
1.40* 
(2.22) 
1.48* 
(2.25) 
1.28* 
(2.01) 
1.38* 
(2.19) 
1.58** 
(2.47) 
1.30* 
(2.06) 
PORAT 
 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.97) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.99) 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.12 
(0.92) 
0.13 
(0.94) 
0.14 
(100) 
OLDRAT 
 
-1.00 
(-1.41) 
-1.05 
(-1.47) 
-1.12 
(-1.52) 
-1.01 
(-1.41) 
-1.05 
(-1.46) 
-1.09 
(-1.48) 
-1.07 
(-1.50) 
-1.12 
(-1.53) 
-1.08 
(-1.48) 
-1.01 
(-1.43) 
-1.06 
(-1.49) 
-1.14 
(-1.55) 
INCOM 
 
0.77 
(0.69) 
0.86 
(0.77) 
0.80 
(0.71) 
0.68 
(0.62) 
0.76 
(0.69) 
0.75 
(0.67) 
0.73 
(0.66) 
0.79 
(0.71) 
0.74 
(0.67) 
0.68 
(0.61) 
0.78 
(0.70) 
0.80 
(0.71) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Logit Model     
NDIS 
 
2.86* 
(1.83) 
2.95* 
(1.86) 
2.87* 
(1.87) 
2.85* 
(1.84) 
2.85* 
(1.85) 
2.86* 
(1.82) 
2.79* 
(1.83) 
2.81* 
(1.83) 
2.86* 
(1.82) 
2.85* 
(1.84) 
2.90* 
(2.27) 
2.58* 
(1.81) 
NDIS* 
Ln(INCOM) 
-0.45 
(-0.17) 
-0.05 
(-0.19) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
NDIS* 
Ln(POP) 
-0.18** 
(-2.44) 
-0.19** 
(-2.41) 
-0.19*** 
(-2.42) 
-0.18** 
(-2.46) 
-0.19** 
(-2.44) 
-0.19** 
(-2.43) 
-0.18** 
(-2.45) 
-0.19** 
(-2.42) 
-0.19** 
(-2.43) 
-0.18** 
(-2.46) 
-0.18** 
(-2.43) 
-0.19** 
(-2.42) 
 2.57** 2.57** 2.57** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 2.53** 
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(45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.9) (45.9) (45.9) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) (45.8) 
Samples 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
Non-zero samples 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Notes: Each column of this table reports a separate estimate of a zero inflated negative binominal model. As discussed in the text, this model has two equations.  The lower panel of the table reports the logit 
model estimates of the probability that nobody becomes a victim of a natural disaster. The upper panel reports the results from the negative binominal regression where numbers are elastic and are evaluated at 
the sample mean values of the dependent and each independent variable, and values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the delta method using robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  In each estimate, constants, year dummies, rates of primary industry‟ populations, number of households, and hours of sunlight are included but not reported to save space 
 
 
